Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by Charities by Mayer, Lloyd Histoshi
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Journal Articles Publications
2007
Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political
Activity by Charities
Lloyd Histoshi Mayer
Notre Dame Law School, lmayer@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lloyd H. Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6 First Amend. L. Rev. 1 (2007-2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/483
GRASPING SMOKE: ENFORCING THE BAN ON
POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY CHARITIES
LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER*
INTRODUCTION
I am very grateful to the First Amendment Law Review and the
University of North Carolina School of Law for hosting this important
symposium on speech by tax-exempt organizations, particularly speech
with respect to public policy issues. Whether we realize it or not, most
of us rely on such speech. For example, we look to Consumer Reports
for product data, to the American Heart Association for health
information, and to the American Red Cross for disaster prevention tips.
More relevant to this symposium, we also increasingly look to tax-
exempt organizations to give us information about the great public policy
debates of the day and rely on their opinions regarding issues of public
concern.
But such speech is not unlimited. Charities, which are the
majority of tax-exempt organizations,I face two major restrictions on
Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; Of Counsel, Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered. A.B., Stanford University, 1989; J.D., Yale Law School, 1994.
I am very grateful for the helpful comments from Matthew Barrett, Kay Guinane,
Thomas Kelley, Marcus Owens, Donald Tobin, and the participants in the Notre
Dame Faculty Colloquium. I also greatly appreciate the research assistance of Sean
Lyttle, Matthew McDonald, Steven McLoughlin, and Elizabeth Zwickert-
Timmermans. In the interest of full disclosure: the firm with which I am Of
Counsel, Caplin & Drysdale, represents All Saints Church with respect to its
ongoing IRS examination focusing on alleged political activity, and as a Member of
that firm I personally represented the NAACP in its now completed IRS examination
focusing on the same issue. All views expressed and all errors in this Article are
mine alone.
1. See Paul Arnsberger, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2003,
SOI BULLETIN: FALL 2006, at 231-32 & n.2, 234, 236 (2006) (reporting that of the
approximately 370,000 annual returns (IRS Form 990 or 990-EZ) filed by tax-
exempt organizations for 2003, charities other than private foundations filed
approximately 263,000 or 70 percent; these figures do not include churches, church-
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their speech about public policy issues. First, they can only engage in a
limited amount of lobbying-that is, seeking to influence legislation.2
Second, they are absolutely prohibited from engaging in political
activity, generally defined as supporting or opposing a candidate for
elected public office.3 It is on the enforcement of this second limitation
that I want to focus. Such enforcement is particularly difficult because,
for the reasons detailed in this Article, violations of this prohibition seem
to be as elusive as smoke, being both difficult to detect and difficult to
separate from permissible charitable activities.
Despite valiant attempts by many scholars, the exact reasons
behind Congress' enactment of the prohibition remain obscure.4 From its
related organizations, or charities with annual gross receipts of less than $25,000, as
such entities are not required to file annual returns with the IRS); Melissa Ludlum &
Mark Stanton, Private Foundations, Tax Year 2003, SOI BULLETIN: FALL 2006, at
192, (2006) (reporting that private foundations filed approximately 76,000 annual
returns (IRS Form 990-PF)); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK, 2006, at 56
(reporting that of the 1.7 million tax-exempt organizations that have successfully
applied to the IRS for recognition of their tax-exempt status as of 2006, 1.1 million
are charities, including private foundations; these figures do not include churches,
church-related organizations, or charities with annual gross receipts of less than
$5,000 that have chosen not to file for recognition of tax-exempt status, as they are
not required to make such a filing); National Center for Charitable Statistics,
Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1996-2006, available at
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profilel.php?state=US (last visited Oct. 26,
2007) (National Center for Charitable Statistics data showing that of the
approximately 1.4 million nonprofit organizations existing in 2004, there were
approximately 935,000 organizations described in Internal Revenue Code section
501(c)(3), including religious congregations). For purposes of this article, a
"charity" is an organization that is described in sections 170(c)(2) (relating to
deductibility of charitable contributions) and 501(c)(3) (relating to tax exemption) of
the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.).
2. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D) (cross-referencing the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
limitation on attempting to influence legislation), 501(c)(3) (limiting attempts to
influence legislation to "no substantial part" of a charity's activities), (h) (providing
an alternate, elective limit on lobbying by charities) (West 2002).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D) (prohibiting charities from "participat[ing] in, or
interven[ing] in ... , any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office" (alteration added)), 501(c)(3) (containing the same
prohibition) (West 2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (elaborating on this
prohibition).
4. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
28-29 (2003) (attributing the prohibition to then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson's desire
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birth to today, some commentators have challenged its validity on both
constitutional and public policy grounds5 while others have strenuously
defended it.6 And its exact parameters remain frustratingly unclear. But
to stop certain charities from opposing his re-election); Ann M. Murphy, Campaign
Signs and the Collection Plate, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 54, 62 (2003) (arguing that the
prohibition arose from a long standing suspicion of political activities by charities
that was strengthened by the McCarthy paranoia of the time, not primarily because
of Senator Johnson's desire to stop his political opponents); Patrick L. O'Daniel,
More Honored in the Breach, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 768 (2001) (making the same
argument as Houck, supra); see also Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly,
Election Year Issues, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY2002, at 335, 448-51 (2001)
(summarizing four theories for why Congress enacted the prohibition, three arguing
that the prohibition was a reaction by Senator Johnson to his political opponents and
one positing that the prohibition was a successful attempt to preempt a much more
restrictive limitation on the activities of charities, and ultimately concluding
"[p]erhaps all four are true; nothing is certain" (alteration added)).
5. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of
Political Campaign Activity by Charities through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1071 (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that Congress should relax the prohibition to
a limited extent for non-constitutional reasons); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and
Pulpits, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001) (arguing that the prohibition should be narrowed
with respect to churches for both public policy and constitutional reasons); Allan J.
Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate in Political Campaigns
(Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 76, 2006) (arguing that the prohibition
should be relaxed with respect to churches for both policy and constitutional
reasons); see also Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the
Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001) (expressing concern about the
ramifications to believers and faith communities of the government's role in
instituting and enforcing the prohibition); Letter from Kevin J. Hasson, Chairman,
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty to Religious Leader (Sept. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.freepreach.org/letter.pdf (offering to defend at no charge
any congregation threatened with loss of tax-exempt status by the IRS because of a
good faith religious message delivered from the pulpit).
6. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 73-83 (arguing that relaxing the
prohibition with respect to churches is unnecessary, would be unwise, and probably
would be unconstitutional); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches
and Charities, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007) (arguing against relaxing the prohibition
and for strengthening enforcement of it).
7. See, e.g., EO Committee of ABA Tax Section Offers Commentary on
Politicking, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 854, 856 (1995) [hereinafter ABA
Comments] (stating that the IRS appears to have been using a "smell test" to
determine what constitutes prohibited political activity, without any unifying
principle); Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
in the midst of all this uncertainty, the prohibition has survived for more
than fifty years in essentially the same form, and recent attempts to alter
it have consistently fallen short.
8
Survival is not, however, the same as vitality. By most accounts,
IRS enforcement of the prohibition has been spotty at best.9 Critics have
and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-
Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 64-71 & n.39 (2004)
(summarizing the existing guidance regarding what exactly constitutes prohibited
political activity and concluding that the definition remains frustratingly
ambiguous); OMB WATCH, THE IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM FOR CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 12-13 (2006) [hereinafter
OMB WATCH REPORT] (arguing that the IRS continues to use what is essentially a
"smell test" when more bright line rules are needed).
8. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Act of 2007, S. 178, 1 10th Cong. (2007)
(barring denial of tax-exempt status by and of deductibility of contributions to a
house of worship or meditation (or affiliated organizations) for engaging in
constitutionally protected activity including "comment on ... election contests...
made in the theological or philosophical context of such organization"); Religious
Freedom Act of 2006, S. 3957, 109th Cong. (2006) (same); Houses of Worship Free
Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2005) (providing that
churches and related entities will not be deemed to have engaged in prohibited
political activity because of presentations "made during religious services or
gatherings"); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692
(as introduced in the House, June 4, 2004) (prohibiting revocation of tax-exempt
status for churches unless they had engaged in at least four separate occasions of
political activity or had intentionally disregarded the prohibition); Houses of
Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235, 108th Cong. (2003) (same);
Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, S. 2886, 107th Cong. (2002)
(providing that churches and related entities could engage in an insubstantial amount
of previously prohibited political activity without loss of tax-exempt status); Bright-
Line Act of 2001, H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing that churches and
related entities could make annual expenditures for political activities of up to five
percent of annual gross revenues without loss of tax-exempt status); Houses of
Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. (2001) (same as S.
2886, 107th Cong.). The House rejected the only one of these provisions to make it
out of committee, 239 to 171. See 148 CONG. REC. H6931-32 (2002) (reporting vote
on H.R. 2357).
9. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional
Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007) [Part IIIC. I] (describing generally the problems
with IRS enforcement respecting the political activities of tax-exempt
organizations); O'Daniel, supra note 4, at 739 (arguing from anecdotal information
that non-compliance is "arguably widespread"); Tobin, supra note 6, at 1356-57
(noting "significant compliance problems" leading to "sporadic and potentially
uneven enforcement"); see also infra Part I (summarizing available evidence of
[Vol. 6
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also asserted that partisan bias taints the IRS' limited enforcement
efforts,' ° although the IRS has strongly denied these allegations" and
government investigations of such complaints have not found such
bias.12 And the IRS' recent attempts at implementing a systematic audit
program have resulted in only a handful of significant sanctions.'
3
noncompliance). But see OMB WATCH REPORT, supra note 7, at 8-10 (arguing that
the available evidence does not indicate widespread noncompliance).
10. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Max Baucus to IRS Commissioner Mark W.
Everson (Oct. 29, 2004), in 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 211-59 (2004) (suggesting that
the IRS had partisan motivations when it initiated the 2004 audit of the NAACP for
alleged political activity); Press Release, Western Journalism Center, $20 Million
Civil Rights Case Charges 1st Amendment Violation (May 8, 1998), in 98 TAX
NOTES TODAY 92-25 (1998) (announcing lawsuit alleging that a 1996 IRS audit was
politically motivated); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 101-04 (Comm. Print 2000)
[hereinafter JCT REPORT] (listing news reports of alleged partisan bias at the IRS
with respect to handling tax-exempt organization matters).
11. See, e.g., Letter from IRS Commissioner Mark Everson to Sen. Max
Baucus (Nov. 12, 2004), in 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 232-15 (2004) (responding to
an inquiry relating to the 2004 audit of the NAACP and providing assurance that the
IRS had operated in a non-partisan manner); Press Release, Internal Revenue
Service, Tax-Exempt Organizations and Political Activities (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id= 130652,00.html (quoting IRS
Commissioner Mark W. Everson as stating "[a]ny suggestion that the IRS has tilted
its audit activities for political purposes is repugnant and groundless" (alteration
added)).
12. Memorandum from Pamela J. Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for
Audit, at 1-2, 3 (Feb. 17, 2005) (stating the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration's review did not identify any indications that the IRS been subject to
political influence in processing information about alleged prohibited political
activity by tax-exempt organizations); JCT REPORT, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that
the Joint Committee staff had found no credible evidence of political motivations in
IRS audit selection or conduct); see also United States v. Judicial Watch, 371 F.3d
824 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (refusing to block enforcement of an IRS summons in part
because target of summons had failed to produce evidence that IRS audit was
politically motivated); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144-45 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (rejecting selective prosecution claim made by a church that had engaged
in prohibited political activity).
13. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE
INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2006) (hereinafter IRS 2004 PACI SUMMARY)
(stating that while it found prohibited campaign activity in fifty-eight of eighty-two
completed examinations, it only proposed revocation of tax-exempt status in three
cases and the imposition of an excise tax penalty in one additional case).
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
This Article attempts to separate fact from fiction with respect to
compliance with the prohibition and, by doing so, to recommend several
steps that the IRS could take to reduce noncompliance. Part I reviews
the limited evidence regarding noncompliance and concludes that while
intentional and large-scale violations of the prohibition draw the most
public attention, they appear to represent only a very small portion of the
violations. One example of such a large scale, but apparently rare,
violation was the purchase by Branch Ministries (also known as the
Church at Pierce Creek) a few days before the 1992 presidential election
of full-page advertisements in both USA Today and The Washington
Times warning Christians that then-Governor Clinton's policy positions
violated biblical precepts.14 It is instead minor, probably inadvertent,
violations that appear to be relatively common and widespread.
Part II argues that widespread but inadvertent and relatively
minor violations of the prohibition are worth the time and effort required
to discourage and prevent them for several reasons. First, such violations
may create a "broken windows" problem: existing literature on
noncompliance with tax laws indicates violations that remain undetected
and uncorrected encourage greater noncompliance both in terms of the
number of violators and the scale of each violation. The second reason
for pursuing such violations is that, regardless of whether they represent
significant expenditures, they create a partisan taint on both the violating
charities and the charitable sector as a whole, undermining the ability of
charities to serve as credible independent voices speaking in the public
interest. It can also be argued that partisan activity by charities has a
greater effect than indicated by the amount of funds spent because of this
"halo effect"-if a charity says it, the message is given greater weight
than if a clearly partisan or self-interested actor were to communicate the
same message. Finally, even if the strength of these arguments is
uncertain, it is better in the face of that uncertainty to spend a relatively
modest amount of resources to curb minor violations now than to risk the
significant possibility that these arguments are correct. Failing to
enforce the prohibition today risks having the noncompliance grow in the
future beyond the IRS' limited ability to check it, causing significant
damage to the charitable sector as a whole, and exerting undue influence
14. See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140.
[Vol. 6
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over elections because of the use of charitable platforms to engage in
partisan activity.
Part III concludes by recommending several ways that the IRS
could modify its enforcement strategies to address the apparently
widespread but inadvertent noncompliance. One way is to reduce the
IRS' reliance on third-party complaints' 5 by reviewing readily accessible
public information that may reveal violations, including state campaign
finance filings, websites, and media reports. Another way is to clarify
what is, and what is not, prohibited by creating safe harbors that give
specific guidelines regarding what a charity is permitted to do with
respect to the most common types of election-related activity, such as
voter guides, while retaining the overall facts and circumstances
approach as an anti-abuse rule to prevent activities that meet the letter of
the new safe-harbor rules but clearly violate the spirit of the prohibition.
A third and final way is to continue to use the flexibility of the current
penalty regime to limit significant sanctions to intentional or repeat
violators while using a "warning ticket" approach for first-time,
apparently unintentional, violators.
I. EVIDENCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE
Noncompliance is, by its very nature, difficult to measure. For
example, while it undisputed that there is significant noncompliance with
the federal income tax laws, the IRS candidly admits that it is difficult toS 16
measure the exact extent of that noncompliance. Noncompliance also
15. See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
16. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE: MULTIPLE
APPROACHES ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE TAX GAP 5 (2007) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (noting that the "IRS has concerns with the certainty of the tax gap estimate
... in part because some areas of the estimate rely on old data, IRS has no estimates
for other areas of the tax gap, and it is inherently difficult to measure some types of
noncompliance"). The IRS estimate of the tax gap for 2001 is $345 billion before
enforcement efforts and $290 billion after such efforts. Press Release, Internal
Revenue Service, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html [hereinafter IRS Tax
Gap Press Release]. The "tax gap" is generally defined as the estimated difference
between the amount of taxes owed and the amount actually collected. GAO REPORT,
supra, at 4.
2007]
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may arise from a variety of sources, ranging from intentional disregard of
the law to inadvertent violations arising from ignorance of the law.17
It is particularly difficult to determine the level of
noncompliance with the prohibition on political activity by charities
18because many violations leave few traces. For example, if a pastor
endorses a candidate from the pulpit, the only record of that endorsement
exists in the memories of the church members and, possibly, in an audio
or video recording of the service. Despite these measurement issues,
there is some evidence regarding the level of noncompliance both from
IRS and non-IRS sources. A review of this limited evidence indicates
that large-scale, intentional violations of the prohibition are rare. The
evidence also indicates, however, that minor, probably unintentional,
violations are relatively widespread and, for the most part, unchallenged
by the IRS.
A. The IRS Record
Until recently, the confidential nature of IRS audits allowed only
scant information regarding violations to become public. Such
information was available only when the IRS either revoked the tax-
exempt status of the offending charity or issued an internal ruling about a
violation that it released to the public in redacted form (i.e., after deleting
all information that could identify the charity at issue).1 9 Even in these
17. See Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV.
33, 35-36 (1994) (identifying six sources for noncompliance: deliberate nonreporting
(tax evasion); unintentional nonreporting (taxpayer error); nonreporting of illegal
income (the underground economy); underpayment of tax properly reported
(administrative failure); reliance on a lawful tax shelter (tax avoidance); and
unclearness of the law regarding the amount of tax owed (ambiguity)); see also IRS
Tax Gap Press Release, supra note 16 (dividing noncompliance into nonfiling,
underpayment of tax, and underreporting of tax, each of which could be the result of
intentional or inadvertent disregard of the law).
18. A similar problem exists with underreporting of cash transactions. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 (noting the inherent difficulty for the IRS of
observing and measuring such noncompliance).
19. I.R.C. § 6103 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) generally prohibits the
government from disclosing information about specific taxpayers. The most
significant exception to this rule is the public disclosure of annual returns and
exemption applications filed by tax-exempt organizations. See I.R.C. § 6104 (West
2002 & Supp. 2006).
[Vol. 6
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instances, complete information about the apparent violation became
available only if the charity fought the IRS in court. But in the wake of
public scrutiny of its enforcement efforts relating to the 2004 election,
the IRS issued a report that sheds more light on the violations that the
IRS detected and pursued in recent years.
The February 2006 IRS report detailed the results of eighty-two
completed examinations of charities that the IRS began because
information it had received supported a reasonable belief that the
charities may have violated the political activity prohibition.20 In
approximately one-fifth of the cases, the IRS found no violation after
• • • 21
further investigation. In only 5 percent of the cases did the IRS impose
penalties, proposing revocation of tax-exempt status in three cases and an
22
excise tax penalty in a fourth case.
The most interesting result, however, is that in almost 70 percent
of the cases the IRS found a violation but chose not to impose a
penalty.23  The IRS' stated reasons for choosing not to impose any
sanction in these cases were that (1) the act of political campaign
intervention was either of a one-time, nonrecurring nature or was taken
in good faith, (2) the charity corrected the violation to the degree
possible and took steps to prevent future violations, and (3) assessment
of a financial penalty under § 4955 was "unavailable." 24 Lois Lerner,
20. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 32: POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 3-5 (2006) [hereinafter IRS 2004 PACI
REPORT]. The cases of an additional twenty-eight charities selected for examination
remained open as the date of the report. Id. at 12.
21. Id. at 18.
22. IRS 2004 PACI SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 3. The excise tax penalty is
imposed by I.R.C. § 4955 on political expenditures by charities, and both the charity
and the responsible managers can be held liable for the tax. I.R.C. § 4955 (West
2002). According to a recent update from the IRS, the number of revocations has
increased to seven, although one of those was not based on political activities.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 'COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE
(2007) [hereinafter IRS 2006 PACI REPORT] 5 (2007) (reporting that the IRS has
now closed 105 examinations, including five resulting in final revocations and two
in proposed revocations).
23. IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, at 18-19.
24. Id. at 18-19. Apparently the unavailability arose either because it was
impossible to determine the amount of expenditures for the prohibited political
activity, which is required to determine the amount of any penalty under I.R.C. §
2007]
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Director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division, later elaborated on
these reasons. Speaking at an American Bar Association conference in
Fall 2006, she explained that in those cases the IRS found that the
charities "either didn't understand the rules, didn't think what they had
done was political campaign intervention, or said, 'Oh, my gosh. We
realize we've done this and we don't want to do it again.'"25
The IRS report also included some interesting additional
information. The internal staff committee that determined whether the
IRS should open an examination also categorized apparent violations
into three types: Type A; Type B; and Type C.26 The three types divided
the cases by both their apparent complexity and the apparent seriousness
of the violations, with Type A cases being the simplest, Type B cases
being more complex, and Type C cases involving egregious and/or
repetitious violations. 27  Examples of Type C cases include ongoing
political contributions that are depleting a charity's assets, continual
widespread advertising for or support of named candidates, and clear and
28
continuing support or opposition of a candidate. Of the cases the IRS
classified in this manner, there were slightly more Type A cases than29 Ti nomto
Type B cases (54 to 46 percent) and no Type C cases. This information
confirms what the low incidence of penalties also suggests-that most
cases involved relatively minor and probably inadvertent violations.3 °
4955, or the amount of expenditures was so low that the penalty "fell below internal
tolerance levels." See id. at 18 n.6.
25. Lois Lerner, Edited Transcript of the Oct. 19, 2006 Meeting of the
American Bar Association's Section of Taxation's Exempt Organizations Committee,
55 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 19, 22 (2007) [hereinafter Lerner Comments].
26. IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, Attachment 1, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 8. The IRS did not categorize cases that it had selected for
examination before the launch of its Political Activities Compliance Initiative,
although it included the results of those examinations in its 2004 PACI report. See
id. at 4, 8.
30. While this article was in the editing process, the IRS reported similar
results for its 2006 political activities audit program. See IRS 2006 PACI REPORT,
supra note 22. The only significant change was that the IRS implemented part of the
first recommendation made by this article. See infra note 93 and accompanying text
(describing the results of the IRS' review of state campaign finance reports for
possible contributions by charities to candidates).
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Anecdotal information about IRS enforcement in this area
reveals a similar pattern of mostly minor and probably inadvertent
violations, although there have been a few high-profile revocation cases.
The most recent such high-profile case involved Branch Ministries (also
known as The Church of Pierce Creek), which purchased full page ads in
national newspapers stating that voting for Bill Clinton was a sin. 31 The
ads even included a solicitation for tax-deductible contributions to pay
for more, similar ads.32  Not surprisingly, the IRS investigated and
ultimately sought revocation of the church's tax-exempt status, a position
the government successfully sustained in court.33
The limited evidence involving violations that pre-date the recent
IRS effort indicates, however, that the IRS has resolved most cases of
political activity by charities in a much less dramatic fashion. Besides
the Branch Ministries case, since the codification of the prohibition in
1954, there have been only a handful of other court decisions involving a
purported charity's qualification for tax-exempt status because of
prohibited political activity. 34 While it is possible that some charities
31. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 140, 144.
34. See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York v. Comm'r, 858 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the IRS' denial of tax-exempt status under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) based on prohibited political activity), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989);
United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981) (ordering the enforcement
of an IRS summons issued to determine, in part, whether a church engaged in
prohibited political activity), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982); Christian Echoes
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972) (upholding
the IRS revocation of tax-exempt status because of prohibited political activity),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 684 (1973). There have also been five other reported
instances where a charity lost its tax-exempt status as a result of political activity.
See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F.Supp.2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing
the revocation of The Way International's tax-exempt status; The Way apparently
challenged the revocation in court, but entered into a settlement with the government
before the court rendered a decision), aff'd, 211 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2000); Celia Roady,
Political Activities of Tax Exempt Organizations, 22 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 401 at
n. 44 (1998) (noting that Jimmy Swaggart Ministries lost its tax-exempt status as a
result of political activity); Press Release, Catholics for Free Choice, Operation
Rescue West Loses Tax-Exempt Status, in 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 278-38 (2006)
(reporting that the IRS' had revoked the tax-exempt status of Youth Ministries, Inc.,
which did business as Operation Rescue West (ORW), apparently based on a
complaint filed by Catholics for Free Choice about a 2004 ORW ad seeking tax-
2007]
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have lost their tax-exempt status because of prohibited political activity
but did not contest that revocation in court, such cases are unlikely to be
very common based on the fact that over the past two-and-one-half years
the IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of only approximately sixty
charities for any reason. 35 The imposition of the excise tax penalty on
prohibited political expenditures by charities over the past three years
also has been a relatively rare event and has involved only small
36
amounts. A review of IRS rulings over the past ten or so years
similarly reveals only a handful of cases where the IRS judged
imposition of the excise tax penalty to be appropriate, and most of those
37
rulings do not even mention revocation as a possible sanction.
deductible contributions to affect the outcome of the 2004 presidential election);
Press Release, The Christian Broadcasting Network Hour, News Release (Mar. 16,
1998), in 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-78 (1998) (announcing that the IRS had revoked
the tax-exempt status of Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) for
1986 and 1987 because of political activities, as well as permanently revoking the
tax-exempt status of three former CBN affiliates, requiring a "significant payment"
by CBN to the IRS, and requiring various organizational changes to prevent future
violations); Press Release, Old Time Gospel Hour, Public Statement (Feb. 17, 1993),
in 93 TAx NOTES TODAY 81-46 (1993) (announcing that the IRS had revoked the
tax-exempt status of Jerry Falwell's Old Time Gospel Hour for 1986 and 1987
because of political activities, as well as requiring the payment of $50,000 in taxes
for those two years and a change in its organizational structure to prevent future
violations).
35. See Recent Revocations of 501(c)(3) Determinations,
http:/lwww.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/o,,id=141466,00.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2007) (listing revocations from 2005 through 2007). Other grounds for
revocation include private inurement, private benefit, excessive lobbying, and having
a more than insubstantial nonexempt purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), (d)(1)
(as amended in 1990).
36. IRS excise tax statistics for 2003 through 2005 report that on average less
than twenty organizations per year paid the excise taxes for political expenditures
(section 4955), disqualifying lobbying expenditures (§ 4912) or premiums paid on
personal benefit contracts, and that the average amount paid for all three of these
taxes was less than $5,500 per year. See SO1 Tax Stats-Charities & Other Tax-
Exempt Organizations Statistics, www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats/article/0,,id=
97176,00.html.
37. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-46-033 (Nov. 12, 2004) (concluding that
a charity's administration of a payroll deduction plan that allowed employees to
contribute to an industry PAC violated the prohibition and that the IRS should
impose the I.R.C. § 4955 excise tax; no mention of revocation); I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 2004-37-040 (Sept. 10, 2004) (concluding that several statements urging
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This evidence taken together indicates either that most violations
are relatively minor and inadvertent or that the IRS has not been catching
the most serious violators. The next section addresses the extent to
which the IRS may have been missing violations, whether minor or
serious.
B. Other Evidence
While the IRS record indicates relatively few instances of
noncompliance, there is other evidence, beyond the purely anecdotal,S 38
indicating that noncompliance is more widespread. One piece of
evidence is a newspaper article reporting on apparently widespread
contributions by churches to candidates and political parties in a
listeners to vote against certain candidates, combined with lack of prompt correction,
justified the imposition of the I.R.C. § 4955 excise tax but not revocation of tax-
exempt status); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2000-44-038 (Nov. 3, 2000) (concluding
that paying for fundraising letter to benefit the charity but signed by a candidate and
that supported essentially the candidate's policy positions justified imposition of the
I.R.C. § 4955 excise tax; no mention of revocation); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-
07-021 (Feb. 19, 1999) (concluding that a single communication criticizing a
candidate that noted the individual's candidacy and made close in time to significant
campaign-related events justified imposition of the I.R.C. § 4955 excise tax; no
mention of revocation); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-12-001 (Mar. 20, 1998)
(concluding that a loan to a political organization justified imposition of the I.R.C. §
4955 excise tax; on separate, private benefit grounds concluding that revocation may
be appropriate); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-35-003 (Aug. 30, 1996) (concluding that
publishing the views on candidates of participants violated by the prohibition and so
resulted in expenditures subject to the I.R.C. § 4955 excise tax; no mention of
revocation); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Mar. 1, 1996) (concluding that
fundraising letters violated the prohibition and so the expenditures for the letters
were subject to I.R.C. § 4955; no mention of revocation); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
91-17-001 (Apr. 26, 1991) (concluding that revocation is appropriate based on
prohibited political activities, and that imposition of the I.R.C. § 4955 excise tax
would also have been appropriate if that section had been in effect during the years
at issue).
38. For anecdotal information, see, e.g., OMB WATCH REPORT, supra note 7,
at 24-32 (listing ten cases of alleged political activity that had been brought to the
IRS' attention), 34 (listing, among other sources, newspaper articles reporting on
these cases). OMB Watch believes that violations are not in fact widespread, and so
the IRS should stop asserting that they are. Id. at 10. For the reasons detailed in this
section, I believe there is evidence that suggests that violations are in fact
widespread.
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particular state. The other piece of evidence consists of responses to
survey questions posed by the Pew Research Center regarding
endorsements by pastors and churches. But both pieces of evidence also
indicate that such violations are relatively minor and may be primarily
inadvertent.
On February 26, 2006, The Baltimore Sun reported on
contributions by over 100 churches to Maryland state and localS . 39
candidates and political party organizations. Maryland, like twenty-
seven other states and the District of Columbia, permits corporations to
make contributions to candidates for state and local office and to political
• 40
parties. Such contributions must, however, be disclosed in publicly
available reports.4 1 Using only those reports, the reporter uncovered 115
churches that had made campaign contributions to approximately forty
42
candidates since 2000. When he contacted some of the churches
involved, the explanations generally were that the pastor or church had
been unaware that the funds were going to fund campaign activity or had
been unaware of the tax law prohibition.43 For example, one of the
pastors whom the reporter contacted stated he did not know that
purchasing a ticket to a political banquet counted as a political
contribution.4 4
The Pew survey provides a national perspective. From
November 9th through 12th of 2006, the Pew Research Center conducted
a detailed survey of voters focusing on the effect of religion on voting
45patterns. Of Americans who reported attending religious services at
39. John Fritze, Political Gifts by Church Break IRS Rules, THE BALTIMORE
SUN, Feb. 26, 2006, at IA.
40. CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2006 (published by the Practicing Law
Institute), at 464-65 (2006); see also MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-226(b), (e)
(2007) (subjecting contributions by a single "person" to certain limits and
considering certain affiliated corporations to be a single contributor); MD. CODE
ANN., art. 1, § 15 (2007) (defining "person" to include a corporation).
41. CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2006, supra note 40, at 467-69; MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-304 (2007).
42. Fritze, supra note 39.
43. Id.
44. Id. (when questioned about the contribution, the pastor replied "It appeared
to be some kind of fundraiser [but] we haven't made . . . contributions to any
campaign" (alteration added)).
45. Greg Smith, Scott Keeter, & John Green, Pew Forum on Religion & Public
Life, Religious Groups React to the 2006 Election: Most are Happy with the
[Vol. 6
least monthly, the survey found that "U]ust 7% . . . said they had been
urged to vote for particular candidates or parties" by clergy or other
46
religious groups. The survey report noted that "[t]his was comparable
to elections in 2000 and 1996. ' '47 While the survey report characterized. ,,48
this percentage as representing "very few respondents, it still indicates
that a large number of churches and other houses of worship may be
violating the prohibition on political activity. According to the Yearbook
of American and Canadian Churches, there were over 325,000 religious
congregations in the United States in 2004. 4 9 If the 7-percent figure is
accurate, and assuming that most of such encouragement came from
clergy speaking in church and that the respondents attended different
congregations, that figure would translate into over 20,000 churches
urging attendees to vote for a particular candidate or party. This is
almost certainly an exaggerated figure. Many respondents could be
remembering comments made by clergy outside of their congregational
leadership roles or by religious organizations that are not tax-exempt
charities. The survey also tested the respondents' recollections, which
creates the significant risk of incorrect answers. But the survey still
indicates that there may be thousands of churches violating the political
activity prohibition, or two orders of magnitude more than the IRS
detected in 2004. The violations could easily have been only one-time
statements, however, possibly made without any knowledge on the part
50
of the speaker that the church was violating the law.
Democratic Victory but Want the Two Parties to Work Together, (Nov. 27, 2006),
available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/99/religious-groups-react-to-the- 2 00 6 -elect
ion.
46. Id. (alteration added).
47. Id. (alteration added).
48. Id.
49. YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN CHURCHES 2006, at 385 (2006)
(based on the number of churches reporting within each reported religious body for
2004). The number of religious congregations may actually be significantly higher
that this figure, as the YEARBOOK relies on voluntary reporting. Id. at 9. A for-profit
company that maintains a database of churches claims there are at least 375,000
churches in the United States. See American Church Lists, available at
http://www.americanchurchlists.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
50. Ten cases of alleged political activity collected by OMB Watch mostly
involved single speeches or statements, although in at least one instance the
complaining party alleged repeated events favoring a particular candidate, partisan
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C. Conclusion
This limited evidence is far from conclusive. It suggests,
however, that there are significantly more violations occurring than the
IRS has detected and pursued. There is no particular reason to believe
that Maryland is unique with respect to the involvement of churches in
state and local political campaigns, nor that the Pew report data is
unreliable. Furthermore, while these sources sought only to identify
political involvement by churches as opposed to other kinds of charities,
there is also no particular reason to believe that churches are unique in
their political involvement. In fact, the violations the IRS did detect and
pursue involved slightly more non-church charities than churches (57
percent to 43 percent), and for those cases that the IRS categorized, the
churches were involved primarily in the simpler "Type A." cases (72
percent were churches) as opposed to the more complex "Type B" cases
(only 15 percent were churches). 51 Another indicator of significant non-
church charity involvement is that preliminary checks of state
contribution databases found that a number of non-church charities also
made political contributions, even though the non-church charities were
harder to identify.
52
voter registration drives, and the distribution of biased voter guides. OMB WATCH
REPORT, supra note 7, at 24-32.
51. IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, at 9-12 (Type A cases were non-
complex, usually single-issue cases assigned to revenue agents for processing as a
correspondence examination; Type B cases were more complex, multi-issue cases
assigned to various field groups.)
52. See infra note 86-87 and accompanying text. There also is a tendency to
blame the "Religious Right" for most church violations. But the Pew survey found a
significant number of churches endorsing Democratic candidates, although
Republican endorsements were more common (4 percent versus 1 percent, with 2
percent being survey respondents who couldn't remember which side was endorsed).
Smith, Keeter & Green, supra note 45. The Treasury Department's Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) also found support for candidates across
the political spectrum: based on forty randomly selected allegations of prohibited
activity received by the IRS, in eighteen cases the charity allegedly supported the
Republican Party or a Republican candidate, in twelve cases the Democratic Party or
a Democratic candidate, and in one case the Green Party or a Green candidate, while
no determination could be made in the other nine cases (TIGTA did not provide a
partisan breakdown for allegations against churches specifically). Inspector General
for Tax Administration, REVIEW OF THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION
At the same time, the limited available evidence indicates that
most violations are relatively minor and probably either the result of a
misunderstanding of the law or otherwise unintentional. The IRS
concluded in the vast majority of the cases it reviewed that no financial
or other penalty was appropriate because the violation was unintentional
or involved relatively small expenditures.5 3  Similarly, the two worst
cases reported in The Baltimore Sun article involved a single candidate
who received-over a five-year period-$16,000 from churches, and a
single church that made seven contributions over that same period, none
larger than $2,000.
54
Given these results, it is prudent to pause and to ask whether any
improvement in IRS enforcement of the political activity prohibition is
needed. If the vast majority of violations are relatively minor and
probably inadvertent, is there any need for the IRS to catch more of the
violators, only to issue what is essentially a warning ticket? To answer
that question requires consideration of the possible long-term effects of
these violations.
1I. DOES IT MATTER?
Assume that further investigation by the IRS or others confirms
the conclusion above that there is relatively widespread noncompliance,
but that this noncompliance involves mostly minor and probably
inadvertent violations. Why should the IRS devote more of its limited
resources to prosecuting these apparently minor and inadvertent
violations? Or, more radically, why should it devote any significant
resources to finding and sanctioning violations that do not rise to a
Branch Ministries level?
Answering these questions requires consideration of four issues.
Will even minor violations, if left undetected and unsanctioned, lead to
ever-increasing violations in terms of either numbers or scale? Will even
minor violations potentially cause significant harm to the charities
involved or the charitable sector as a whole by undermining credibility
PROCESS FOR REVIEWING ALLEGED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION BY TAX
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 13 (2005), http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/ 200 5rep
orts/200510035ff.pdf [hereinafter TIGTA Report].
53. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
54. Fritze, supra note 39 at I0A.
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with the general public? Or, conversely, will even "minor" violations
have a disproportionate electoral effect because of the positive public
reputation charities generally enjoy? Finally, even if the answers to these
questions are uncertain, are the risks they identify significant enough to
justify at least modest steps by the IRS to detect and prevent such
violations? This section will address each of these issues.
A. The "Broken Windows" Problem
The existing literature on compliance with the federal tax laws is
almost as inconclusive as it is large.55  Both limited data and
methodological difficulties have frustrated attempts to come to definitive
conclusions regarding the importance of various economic, cultural and
psychological factors in determining whether taxpayers comply with
those laws. 56 That said, the various studies have generally identified the
factors that affect intentional noncompliance and, to a lesser extent,
inadvertent noncompliance. Those factors include, not surprisingly, the
perceived risk of detection and level of penalties, but also the individual
taxpayer's views on the fairness of the tax system, the effectiveness of
55. Ronald G. Cummings et al., Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance:
Experimental and Survey Evidence 32-35 (The Leitner Program in Int'l &
Comparative Political Econ., Paper No. 2005-22, 2005), available at
www.yale.edu/leitner/papers.htm (providing a list of references relating to the
impact of social and cultural norms on tax-law compliance); Alex Raskolnikov,
Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting
Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 576-579 (2006) (reviewing the existing
scholarship on tax law compliance); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax
Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
1425, 1429-38 (2002) (same).
56. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Why do People Pay Taxes, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21,
36 (1992) (concluding that individual taxpayers "exhibit a remarkable diversity in
behavior" so "some new theory is needed" to deal with all of the factors that
apparently affect compliance); Cooper, supra note 17, at 69 (concluding that
empirical tests of economic-based compliance models lead to either unsurprising or
inconclusive results); Raskolnikov, supra note 55, at 577, 579 (noting that economic
models of compliance support the basic intuition that probability of punishment and
nominal penalties affect taxpayer behavior but fail to explain the relatively high level
of actual compliance, and that empirical research on both economic and non-
economic factors that possibly influence compliance "lends some support to all
existing models of taxpayer behavior, while giving a decisive advantage to none").
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the government in using tax revenues, and the degree of compliance by
other taxpayers.57 Counter-intuitively, actually being audited appears to
increase noncompliance by intentional violators, but it also appears to
reinforce compliance among audited taxpayers who are seeking to
comply with the law and may increase deterrence among taxpayers
generally if there is already a high level of compliance.
58
The existence of widespread, minor violations directly implicates
both the perceived risk of detection and the degree of compliance by
other taxpayers. If a significant minority of charities is engaging in
political activity, this fact would appear to have two effects on
compliance. First, noncompliant charities are likely to continue and
57. See, e.g., Alm, supra note 56, at 36 (citing perceived risk of detection,
level of penalties, and value of public goods that tax payments finance as affecting
compliance); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance,
86 VA. L. REv. 1781, 1784-85 (2000) (noting that beyond the effects of audit and
penalty rates, individuals also tend to comply because they believe others do,
because they believe tax authorities are fair or have fair procedures, and because
they believe the government is using tax revenues effectively); Raskolnikov, supra
note 55, at 578-79 (noting that the existing research indicates that beyond audit and
penalty rates, other factors that may influence compliance include social norms,
perceptions of the fairness of the tax laws and their administration, and perceptions
of whether the government spends tax revenues appropriately, although the relative
strength of each factor (and, in some cases, whether the factor actually influences
compliance at all) is uncertain).
58. See, e.g., Marcelo Bergman, Do Audits Enhance Compliance? An
Empirical Assessment of VAT Enforcement, 59 NAT'L TAX J. 817, 829-830 (2006)
(concluding that audits tend to either not affect or increase noncompliance by
audited noncompliant taxpayers, but at the same time audits appear to make
compliant taxpayers who are audited even more compliant and may increase overall
deterrence in a generally compliant taxpayer population, based on the impact of
audits on subsequent compliance for value added taxpayers in Argentina and Chile);
Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Income Tax, 1977-
1986, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 395, 406 (1990) [hereinafter Effect ofAudit] (concluding that
increasing audit rates increases tax revenues collected, although also noting that a
decrease in audit rates appears to increase the number of taxpayers who file returns,
suggesting that an increase in audit rates would increase the number of (illegal)
nonfilers); see also Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities
and Noncompliance (2004) [hereinafter Enforcement Activities],
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04dubin.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (concluding
that IRS criminal investigations have a measurable positive effect on voluntary
compliance, particularly when such investigations result in incarceration and
probation (rather than fines)).
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possibly expand their levels of noncompliance absent any indication that
the IRS is enforcing the ban against them-the perceived risk of
detection presumably is low and presumably becomes even lower over
time as the IRS continues to be absent. Second, other charities see or
hear about the noncompliance, which may reduce their perceived risk of
detection and also may create a "culture of noncompliance."59  One
example of such a culture is found among the self-employed and small
business owners, where noncompliance is so widespread that it both puts
compliant taxpayers at a competitive disadvantage and may encourage
other types of taxpayers to avail themselves of any opportunities for
noncompliance that may exist. In a limited sense, this observation is
similar to the famous, although now contested, "broken windows" theory
that small signs of neglect and deterioration in a building soon lead both
to much larger levels of neglect and to intentional destruction.61
The strength of these conclusions is uncertain, however. While
general tax-compliance research suggests that a lower perceived risk of
detection increases noncompliance, that theory has been difficult to
62prove definitively. Similarly, there is some evidence that
59. See Michael C. Durst, Report of the Second Invitational Conference on
Income Tax Compliance, 42 TAx LAW. 705, 708 (1988) (concluding that the self-
employed and other small-business owners have a high level of noncompliance that
is at least tacitly assisted by their customers, thereby contributing to "a widespread
'culture' of noncompliance"); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 8, 15 (noting
that underreporting of business income accounted for $109 billion of the $197 billion
individual income tax underreporting total, of which underreporting relating to sole
proprietor income and losses constituted, at $68 billion, the largest share of the entire
tax gap and reflected a 57 percent misreporting rate among filers reporting such
income and losses).
60. Durst, supra note 59 at 716-17.
61. See generally GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOW: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996);
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
March 1982, at 29.
62. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 17, at 69 (noting that proving whether an
increase to the expected penalty, such as by increasing the perceived risk of
detection, increases compliance "has not been easy to substantiate"); Raskolnikov,
supra note 55, at 578 (noting that while several studies support the basic predictions
of the economic deterrence model-that higher penalties and a higher likelihood of
incurring them improve tax compliance-these predictions have not been
definitively proved and the effect of these factors on noncompliance appears to be
small).
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noncompliance increases when there is significant perceived
noncompliance by other taxpayers as well as personal acquaintance with
tax evaders, 63 but again this theory has been difficult to prove. Even if
these theories are definitively proven, there are two hurdles to extending
them to the particular context of the prohibition on charities engaging in
political activity. First, the behavior of charities and their officials may
be significantly different than that of individual taxpayers, who are the
64
subject of almost all of the studies on compliance. Second, it is not
clear that increased detection by the IRS will result in a perception of an
increased risk of detection by charities. So while unchecked
noncompliance, even at a minor level, may lead to greater
noncompliance by both the original violators and by other charities,
those results are not a given. I will address the issue of how to deal with
the uncertainty of this conclusion at the end of this section.
B. The Taint Problem
The second argument for why such violations matter is based on
the reasons for the prohibition in the first place. The usual reason cited
for the prohibition is that without it the federal government would be
providing a government "subsidy" for political activities because
charities can receive tax-deductible charitable contributions from their
supporters. 65 But there is a second oft-cited reason for the prohibition-
the generally held view that charities should serve the public interest and
that allowing them to support or oppose particular candidates or parties
would taint their fidelity to the public interest.
66
63. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 65 (citing surveys supporting this theory).
64. See id. at 46, 69-88 (arguing why the incentives for tax evasion by publicly
traded companies are different than the incentives for tax evasion by individual
taxpayers).
65. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 5, at 1079 (describing the subsidy argument);
Mayer, supra note 9, at 637-644 (describing the subsidy rationale for the
prohibition); Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer's Perspective on Section 527
Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776-78 (2007) (same); Tobin, supra
note 6, at 1317-20 (same).
66. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 5, at 1091-94 (describing one version of this
theory that views the charitable sector as separate from government and so properly
excluded from the selection of government actors (i.e., through elections)); Deidre
Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903, 925-26
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The second point was made by Diana Aviv, President of
Independent Sector, during this symposium. When asked about the
wisdom of the prohibition on political activity by charities, she did not
make the subsidy argument. Instead, she noted the special role that
charities play in our society and how that role could be compromised if
they became agents for electing or defeating particular candidates.
67The subsidy argument, even if accepted, does not provide much
support for substantial enforcement against minor, albeit possibly
widespread, violations because such violations are unlikely to create
much of a subsidy problem for the simple reason that they do not involve
a significant use of tax-deductible funds. If the taint argument is
accepted, however, even minor violations can have the effect of
undermining the public interest reputation associated with all of a
charity's activities or even damage that reputation for the charitable
sector as a whole. The taint argument therefore indicates that combating
even minor violations may be a worthwhile use of the IRS' enforcement
resources.
C. The Halo Problem
The "halo effect" that charities enjoy also has another
ramification in this context. Even if the political activity expenditures by
a charity are relatively small, they may have a disproportionate electoral
effect because of the goodwill charities generally enjoy. For example, a
pastor speaking from the pulpit or a human-services charity leader
writing in the charity's newsletter will likely be addressing an audience
that is relatively open to his or her electoral message because of the
charitable platform from which he or she is speaking, especially as
compared to an electoral message from a self-interested candidate,
political party, or business interest. Of course, it could also be argued
that the audience may already have political values similar to those of the
speaker-i.e., the pastor is literally preaching to the choir-but the
(2001) (concluding that church political involvement would threaten the integrity
and independence of churches); Tobin, supra note 6, at 1322-24 (explaining various
ways that churches may be harmed if they are permitted to engage in political
activity).
67. See Buckles, supra note 5, at 1084 (explaining potential weaknesses in the
subsidy argument).
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benefit of using the charity's voice may still be significant. For example,
one significant indication of the possible influence of charities on
elections is the extent to which candidates seek to use the positive
reputations of charities, particularly churches, to enhance their electoral
68
chances. So while there is very limited evidence of large-scale
69political advertising campaigns by charities or wholesale funneling of
funds to candidates through charities,70 even the relatively minor but
apparently widespread incidences of pastors endorsing candidates on a
Sunday shortly before an election or other charity leaders briefly
mentioning a candidate favorably in a newsletter may have a decisive
effect in some elections.
D. Dealing with Uncertainty
None of these arguments is completely compelling, however, for
the simple reason that it is unclear if they are correct and, even if they
are, how strong an effect minor, albeit widespread, violations really have
on future noncompliance, on the reputation of the charities involved or
the charitable sector as a whole, or on actual voting patterns. While the• 71
available studies indicate that noncompliance breeds noncompliance,
whether that would definitely occur in this specific context and to what
degree is unknown. And while the taint argument may make intuitive
sense, to what extent charities or the charitable sector as a whole would
lose credibility is far from clear. Finally, whether perceived
endorsements of or opposition to candidates by charities and their leaders
actually change voting patterns is also uncertain.
So, given this uncertainty, why should the IRS devote some of
its limited resources to increasing enforcement in this area or even
maintaining enforcement at its current level? One answer is that the
evidence and studies already cited indicate that the risk of increasing
noncompliance has at least a significant possibility of being real, and, if
68. See, e.g., Marcus S. Owens & Natalie E. Fay, Penalizing Instigators of
Political Campaign Intervention, 113 TAX NOTES 504, 505 (2006) (describing
various attempts by candidates to speak at or appear in churches as part of their
campaign strategies).
69. See supra Part I.
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. See supra Part It(A).
20071 GRASPING SMOKE
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
it is, it will be more difficult and resource-consuming to combat the
resulting higher level of noncompliance in the future. Similarly, if minor
but widespread violations, left unchecked, will significantly damage both
individual charities and the charitable sector's reputation, it is not clear to
what extent, if any, the government could remedy the damage once done
or what resources would be required to implement a remedy. As for the
"halo" effect, it is small comfort to losing candidates to know that in the
future the IRS will be more diligent about preventing charities from
using their privileged platform to influence elections in violation of the
law if the illegal efforts of charities have a significant electoral effect. At
the same time, this uncertainty argues against a radical shift of
government resources toward enforcing the prohibition, even assuming it
would be politically realistic for either the IRS or the Congress to
implement such a shift.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?
So assume that there are widespread, if mostly minor and
inadvertent, violations of the prohibition-a proposition that the IRS may
72be able to test by following the first suggestion below -and that such
violations are not only illegal but may cause significant harm by
encouraging increasing levels of noncompliance, damaging the
reputations of both violating charities and the charitable sector as a
whole, and significantly influencing elections for the reasons outlined
above. Given that the IRS' current approach does not appear to be
detecting or preventing most violations, what could the IRS do
differently without a radical redeployment of its enforcement resources,
which is not justified given the uncertainty of these risks? The IRS has
already launched a dedicated audit program focusing on these
violations, 73 increased its public education efforts in this area, 74 and used
72. The IRS has in fact recently implemented one part of this first suggestion
by checking state campaign-finance records, which confirmed this proposition in
that this check revealed several hundred apparent campaign contributions by
charities over a three-year period but totaling less than $350,000. IRS 2006 PACI
REPORT, supra note 22, at 6.
73. See IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, at 15-24 (describing the results
of the 2004 version of that program and the procedures for the 2006 version).
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no less prominent an official than the IRS Commissioner himself to
advertise its increased activity. 75  But there is more that it could do
without breaking its budget.
First, the IRS should more pro-actively seek information about
violators through readily available public sources. This approach, if
implemented in a neutral, nonpartisan fashion, has the added benefit of
lessening the IRS' reliance on third-party complaints, which exposes the
IRS to accusations of partisan bias. 76 Second, it can reduce the inherent
uncertainty surrounding what in fact is improper political activity for a
charity by adopting an approach used in many other tax contexts. That
approach is to create bright lines and safe harbors wherever possible, but
also to create a more general anti-abuse rule to prevent activities that
adhere to the letter of the more specific rules but violate the spirit of the
statutory prohibition. Third and finally, the IRS should continue its
practice of issuing "warning tickets" to first-time, apparently inadvertent,
offenders while also using the full range of penalties at its disposal for
repeat and intentional violators. The IRS has for the most part not done
the latter, so no changes to the penalty regime are justified, at least until
the effectiveness of the existing regime has been sufficiently tested and
found wanting.
A. Pro-actively Gathering Information about Possible Violations
Available information indicates that the IRS relies entirely or
almost entirely on third-party complaints to identify potential violations
of the prohibition.77  This reliance creates two problems. First, the
74. Internal Revenue Services, Charities, Churches, and Educational
Organization-Political Campaign Intervention, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitab
le/article/O,,id=155030,00.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (listing a variety of
resources from the IRS relating to the prohibition).
75. See, e.g., Mark W. Everson, Comm'r, IRS, Remarks at the City Club of
Cleveland (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=154788,00.html
(spending over half of his speech addressing the IRS' efforts to educate about and
enforce the prohibition).
76. See supra note 10.
77. The IRS report on its 2004 Political Activities Compliance Initiative
("PACI") simply states that "[t]he cases came to the IRS from many sources," but
the Inspector General for Tax Administration's report on PACI notes that of the
forty randomly selected "information items" the IRS received which alleged
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limited evidence available indicates that this reliance uncovers only a
very small percentage of violators. 8  Second, this reliance exposes the
IRS to the allegation that there is partisan bias in its selection of audit
targets, if for no other reason than that the IRS relies so heavily on
complainers, many of whom may be politically motivated.79 This
method of identifying possible violators also seems an odd way to
enforce the law. It is analogous to state troopers sitting in rest stops
nursing their coffee and donuts until somebody calls 911, instead of
actively patrolling the highways. This method is also an approach the
IRS tries to avoid in other contexts, primarily by requiring third-party
reporting of financial information (such as employers reporting the
wages of employees on IRS Form W-2), which commentators agree has
been a highly effective means of deterring noncompliance." This
consensus is in sharp contrast with the scholarly uncertainty about the
effectiveness of other techniques for deterring noncompliance." The
prohibited political activity, "several" were received from internal IRS sources, but
apparently the vast majority were received from individual taxpayers, other Federal
Government agencies, political candidates, and the Congress (alteration added). IRS
2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, at 2; TIGTA REPORT, supra note 52, at 12, 14.
78. See supra Part I(B).
79. See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, GOP Lawmakers Contacted IRS About NAACP,
Documents Show, 52 EXEMPT. ORG. TAX REV. 252 (2006) (reporting that documents
obtained by the NAACP from the IRS showed that several Republican members of
Congress, and apparently no Democratic members, had forwarded complaints from
constituents alleged prohibited political activity); Terry Mattingly, Activists Spy on
Churches for IRS Political Violations, DAILY BREEZE, Oct. 2, 2004, at B3 (reporting
on efforts by activists on both sides of the aisle to identify and report church support
of opposition candidates).
80. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 12-13 (noting the substantial
positive effect of withholding or information reporting by third parties on tax
compliance); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX
93-98 (1997) (concluding that third-party reporting combined with document
matching by the IRS has been so effective in preventing noncompliance that it has
created a two-tier system of enforcement, one tier for taxpayers whose income is
almost entirely subject to such reporting and another tier for taxpayers whose income
is not); see generally Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third
Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (exploring
how and when information reporting and tax withholding by third parties fosters
compliance).
81. See supra note 55.
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IRS has also used more creative techniques for obtaining information
82
needed to identify otherwise hard-to-detect noncompliance.
While third party reporting is not a viable option in the context
of the prohibition on political activity, the IRS can and should do the
information age's equivalent of patrolling to enforce the prohibition: it
should identify possible violators by checking readily available sources
of public information. Three sources come readily to mind. First, in
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia, corporations are
permitted to make campaign contributions. 83 As The Baltimore Sun
article indicates, publicly available state campaign finance reports in
those states may contain the names of charities that have made suchS • 84
contributions. Second, pre-election Internet searches for "voter guides"
and similar materials may reveal charities who are distributing materials
that support or oppose candidates-most of which will presumably
disappear from the Internet after the election is over. Finally, pre-
election searches of newspapers-which can readily be done through
electronic databases such as LexisNexis-for candidates' speaking
schedules and similar information may also reveal the improper
involvement of charities in campaigns.
The effectiveness of these suggestions is not purely hypothetical.
While I have left it to the IRS to refine how such information sources
should be used, spot checks of the first and third sources indicate that
85they may reveal a significant number of violations. First, as already
noted, a Baltimore Sun reporter found that over a six-year period 115
86
churches had made campaign contributions. Searches for "church" in
the names of contributors in Washington and Indiana revealed campaign
contributions from at least nine churches over a five-year period in
Washington and from thirteen churches in Indiana over a seven-year
period, counting only contributors whose names clearly indicated that
82. See, e.g., IRS, Press Release, IRS Sets New Audit Priorities (Sept. 2002),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105695,00.html (describing, among other
projects, the "Offshore Credit Card Project," pursuant to which the IRS served
summons on major credit card companies and businesses for information about
credit cards issued to U.S. customers by banks in alleged tax haven countries).
83. See supra note 40.
84. See supra note 38-43 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org (last visited May 25,
2007).
86. See Fritze, supra note 39.
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they were in fact a church and not either an individual or business who
happened to have "church" in its name. 87  Searching for non-church
charities is more difficult because terms such as "hospital" that occur in
the names of many such charities also appear in the names of many
taxable entities. But looking only for contributors with the word
"university," "college," or "school" in their names, and only counting as
contributors those entities that appeared in the IRS Publication 78 list of
charities,88 revealed contributions by two such charities in Washington,
four in Indiana, and fourteen in Maryland.
89
While these initial numbers are relatively small, they are based
on only a very cursory review of these databases and were far from
comprehensive given that some churches do not have the word "church"
in their names and only a subset of non-church charities have the words
"university," "college," or "school" in theirs. These initial numbers also
cover only three relatively small states. 90 Finally, and perhaps most
troubling from the perspective of overall noncompliance, these figures
cover only contributions to candidate campaigns, which, unlike many
other election-related activities, are clearly a violation of the prohibition
regardless of the surrounding facts and circumstances. 9'
87. Based on searches of the campaign finance databases maintained by the
Washington Public Disclosure Commission, http://www.pdc.wa.gov/Public/
Campaign/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2007), and the Indiana Secretary of
State, http://www.indianacampaignfinance.com/INPublic/inSearch.aspx (last visited
Oct. 27, 2007).
88. Which misses, for example, church schools that are not separately
incorporated and so are not required to apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status.
89. Based on searches of the databases listed supra note 87, and the campaign
finance database maintained by the Maryland Board of Elections,
http://mdelections.umbc.edu/campaignfinance/index.php (last visited Oct. 27,
2007).
90. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, each of these states had approximately
5 or 6 million residents, as compared to 281 million residents for the United States as
whole. See Resident Population of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico: Census 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/population/
cen2000/tab02.pdf.
91. I.R.S. Publication 1828: Tax Guide for Churches and Religious
Organizations 7 [hereinafter IRS Tax Guide for Churches] (stating that
"[c]ontributions to political campaign funds . . . clearly violate the prohibition
against political campaign activity" (alteration added)).
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In fact, while this article was in the editing process, the IRS
released a report on its enforcement of the prohibition relating to the
922006 elections. While for the most part the activities and the level of
noncompliance it found were similar to what it found with respect to the
2004 elections, the report also revealed that the IRS has already
implemented this recommendation-checking state campaign-finance
records for contributions by charities. Focusing on contributions
reported in 2003 through 2005, the IRS found 269 apparent cases of
direct contributions to candidates, totaling almost $350,000. 9' These
results indicate that this is clearly an avenue that IRS should continue to
pursue.
Searching election-season newspaper articles is a more involved
endeavor because such articles will often report either clearly innocuous
activities or those, such as candidate appearances, that will only violate
the prohibition if certain facts are present. But an initial inquiry indicates
that such articles may be fertile ground for uncovering possible
violations. A search of the LexisNexis "News, Most Recent Two Years"
database for articles during the five months preceding the 2006 election
where "candidate" and "church" appeared in the same sentence revealed
over 2,000 such articles.94 A spot check of these articles95 supported
their relevance, with at least of quarter of them referring to candidate
appearances or forums at churches or similar election-related activities.
Of course some of the articles are duplicative, some report already-
commenced IRS investigations growing out of previous alleged political
activity, and some of the reported activities are undoubtedly candidate-
neutral and so permitted, but, presumably, further refinement of such
searches could better limit the results to situations that raise the greatest
likelihood of prohibited political activity.
None of these very preliminary results should be taken as
providing an accurate measure of the overall level of violations. They do
strongly indicate, however, that relatively simple searches of publicly
available information may (and with respect to the campaign-finance
databases, almost certainly will) reveal numerous violations that so far
92. IRS 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 22.
93. Id. at 6.
94. See www.lexis.com.
95. Looking at every 100th article.
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have escaped IRS scrutiny. If this amateur sleuth from his ivory tower
computer can find all of these speeders, certainly the trained and well-
equipped state troopers can find many more.
The IRS should not, and almost certainly could not, simply direct
an employee to hop onto a computer and start conducting random
96
searches. Nor should it take every new story or Internet posting as 100
percent accurate. But it would seem logical for the IRS to use some of
the resources dedicated to its political activity compliance program to
develop appropriate and relevant protocols for searches and for
evaluating the information so found. Another option would be for the
IRS to use its recently created Exempt Organizations Data Analysis Unit,
designed to mine data from not only IRS databases but also outside
databases and the Internet, for this task.97 The IRS' recent success in
checking state campaign finance databases for possible contributions to
candidates by charities indicates that it should be able to design and
implement other data searches, such as the ones recommended here. 98
For churches, gathering such information is complicated by the
existence of § 7611. That section bars the IRS from even starting an
inquiry into whether a church qualifies for tax-exempt status under
section 501(c)(3) unless a relatively senior official has reasonable belief
that the church may not in fact be tax-exempt and follows certain
required notice procedures. 99 This section does not, however, appear to
require that such a reasonable belief exist before the IRS seeks publicly
available information about either churches generally or a specific
church. 100 So while the IRS must tread carefully once it has uncovered
96. The IRS' internal criminal investigation procedures describe under what
conditions certain information collecting activities are permitted. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL §§ 9.4.1.2, 9.4.1.3 (2005). It is
unclear to what extent these specific procedures are applied outside of the criminal
investigation context, although presumably the general requirement that only
information necessary for the enforcement and administration of the tax laws will be
sought applies throughout the IRS. See id. § 9.4.1.2 (paragraph 1).
97. See J. Christine Harris, IRS Will Enlist New EO Units to Complement
Division's Work, Says Officials, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 150 (2003).
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the initial results of
the IRS' 2006 search of state campaign finance databases).
99. I.R.C. § 761 l(a)(1) (West 2002).
100. See I.R.C. § 7611(h)(2) (West 2002) (defining a "church tax inquiry" as
"any inquiry to a church" (emphasis added)); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
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publicly available information that indicates a particular church may
have violated the political activity prohibition, this section does not
appear to prevent the uncovering of that information in the first place.
But gathering more information about possible violations is only
one way to reduce noncompliance. Another is to provide better guidance
regarding what is in fact a violation, therefore enabling charities that
want to comply-which appears to be the vast majority of them,
including many of the violators-to do so easily. So it is to the issue of
how to provide clearer, but still effective, rules that I turn next.
B. Creating Safe Harbors and an Anti-Abuse Rule
Many commentators have urged the Treasury Department and
IRS to adopt a bright-line definition of political activity, either tracking
the "express advocacy" definition in election law or some similar, easy to
understand definition. 0' The creation of such a definition offers at least
three apparent benefits. First, it offers the hope of simplifying the maze
of precedential and nonprecedential rulings that apply the prohibition in a
variety of contexts. In most cases, these rulings leave charities
struggling to balance a list of relevant factors with little guidance
regarding the weight of each factor or what other factors might
ultimately be found by the IRS to be relevant.' °2  This hope is
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.76.7.4.1 (2004) (stating that the IRS can obtain the
information supporting a reasonable belief from, among other sources, newspaper
articles, internet web pages, documents distributed by the church, and information in
the possession of third parties).
101. See OMB WATCH REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13 (arguing for bright-line
rules and/or safe harbors); ABA Comments, supra note 7, at 854 (noting that many
members of the ABA Section of Taxation would prefer an "express advocacy"
standard, but acknowledging that the IRS had explicitly rejected use of such a
standard); Dessingue, supra note 66, at 928 (urging the IRS to limit the definition of
political activity to "explicit endorsements ... and other clear and unambiguous
support"); Opinion, Free Speech vs. Tax Code, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec.
14, 2004, at A14 (suggesting that the IRS adopt the express advocacy standard).
102. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328 (listing eleven factors that
are relevant to determining whether an "issue ad" is political activity, but carefully
noting that other factors may be relevant); see generally Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25
I.R.B. 1421 (ruling on whether activities described in twenty-one factual scenarios
are political activities); Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year
Issues, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
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particularly attractive because it is generally agreed that the complexity
of the tax laws is one major cause of noncompliance, since taxpayers do
not understand, or can easily feign not understanding, complex rules.
Complexity makes it more difficult for the IRS to detect noncompliance
and to administer the tax laws. 103
Second, bright-line rules also can limit the discretion of
government officials when they are enforcing those rules in a particular
case.104  Limited discretion may be particularly attractive in a context
where enforcement actions trigger allegations of improper political
influence, whether justified or not. °5 Finally, bright-line rules shift some
of the costs of applying a general principle, such as the prohibition of
political activity, to the government that must design the rules, rather
than forcing the regulated population to spend its resources on
• • 106
determining what that principle means in specific situations. Such a
shift would hopefully reduce the "chilling" effect that a lack of bright-
line rules can create. This chilling effect arises because taxpayers who
are not willing or able to pay the costs required to determine the exact
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY2002 335, 369-384 (2001) (summarizing the
numerous IRS rulings applying the Code section 501(c)(3) definition of political
activity to particular situations); IRS, Fact Sheet, Election Year Activities and the
Prohibition on Political Campaign Intervention for Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations (Feb. 2006), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/artic
le/0,,id=154712,00.html (explaining the prohibition and summarizing the standards
for various types of election and candidate-related activities). While Revenue
Ruling 2004-6 explicitly applies only to non-charitable tax-exempt organizations, the
IRS has indicated that the same definition of political activity also applies to
charities. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 7.25.4.7(2)
(1999).
103. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 (citing the complexity of the tax
laws as one major factor contributing to noncompliance); GRAETZ, supra note 80, at
68-88 (same); Durst, supra note 59, at 728-731 (same); Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act
and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1048-49 (2003) (same).
104. See William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street. The Taxpayer's Ability
to Disavow Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381, 451-52 (1991); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 260-61
(1974) (noting the attractiveness of this point in the tax law context, where
competing goals make the applicable general standard less exact).
105. See supra note 10.
106. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
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parameters of a vague, general standard may avoid even permitted
activities out of a fear that they fall within the prohibition. °7
The problem with bright-line rules, however, is that they come
with perhaps less apparent trade-offs. First, such rules may lead to
sophisticated members of the regulated community finding ways to
technically comply with the rules while violating the underlying spirit
motivating them. For example, assume that the IRS did adopt an
"express advocacy" definition for political activity. The experience in
the election law area, which for many years used just such a definition, is
that it allowed organizations to make communications that were as (or
even more) effective in shaping voters' positions than express advocacy
but fell outside the technical definition of "express advocacy" and so
escaped the reach of federal election law. 108 The classic example of such
an ad is the one relating to Bill Yellowtail, then a candidate for Congress,
which carefully avoided mentioning "vote," "election," or similar
express advocacy terms but left little doubt in the hearer's mind as to
whether he was worthy of the hearer's vote.
0 9
Even if existing charities would be unlikely to engage in such
manipulation, there is the very real risk that if it is possible to take
107. See OMB WATCH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3, available at
http://www.ombwatch.org/pdfs/pacifull.pdf (noting the chilling effect of IRS
enforcement of the prohibition); Dessingue, supra note 66, at 929 (making this point
with respect to churches); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 104, at 263 (discussing the
chilling effect of vague standards generally).
108. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 192-193, 196-97 (2003) (noting that
the express advocacy "magic words" text is "functionally meaningless," and that the
record demonstrated the widespread use of ads that carefully avoided being express
advocacy yet nevertheless clearly influenced elections); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 45 (1976) (noting that by limiting the reach of election law to "express advocacy"
communications for constitutional reasons, the Court necessarily "facilitat[ed]
circumvention" because "[i]t would naively underestimate the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they
would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on
express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's
campaign." (alteration added)).
109. McConnell at 193 n.78 ("'Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family
values but took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only slapped
her. But 'her nose was not broken.' He talks law and order . . . but is himself a
convicted felon. And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to
make his own child support payments-then voted against child support
enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values."').
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advantage of a bright-line rule, new politically oriented players would
enter the charitable sector to take advantage of the subsidy mentioned
earlier (and the confidentiality of donor identities)."10 For example, when
Congress enacted laws limiting the ability of candidates to raise large
unlimited donations for organizations other than charities, then-
Representative Tom DeLay created a new charity to receive such
donations in connection with activities to be conducted at the 2004
Republican National Convention."' While that effort died under the
glare of media scrutiny, 112 certainly many political players would be
tempted to take advantage of the charitable form if more bright-line rules
permitted them to do so legally.
The government can of course respond to such manipulation
with more bright-line rules to counter the modifications. But such new
rules could easily lead to a maze of bright-line rules that is so complex it
poses an even greater challenge to unsophisticated taxpayers and IRS
employees than the general standard did initially.' While a complex set
of bright-line rules might limit the IRS' discretion in particular cases, it
would still leave the charities with the choice of incurring significant
compliance costs, ignoring the rules and pleading ignorance if detected,
or avoiding any activities that might fall within the now complex rules.
So how can the Treasury Department and the IRS effectively
balance these concerns? Scholars, Congress, and the Treasury
Department have often gravitated toward a hybrid approach. That
approach involves creating safe harbors that will apply in the vast
majority of situations, coupled with an anti-abuse rule that can be
invoked when the general standards those rules are meant to implement
have been violated though the technical requirements of the rules have
110. See STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN & KARA D. RYAN, SOFT MONEY IN THE 2006
ELECTION AND THE OUTLOOK FOR 2008: THE CHANGING NONPROFITS LANDSCAPE 1
(Campaign Finance Institute, 2007) (concluding that increased regulatory pressure
on so-called "527 organizations" had resulted in switching election-related advocacy
funding and activities to non-charitable organizations tax-exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c)).
111. 2 Groups Try to Block Charity Tied to Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003,
at A34.
112. Michael Slackman, Charity Tied to Delay Cancels New York Convention
Events, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A19.
113. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv.
860, 867-72 (1999).
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been met. 114 Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the taxpayers have
certainty, the line-drawing burden is placed on the government, and the
discretion of government officials in individual enforcement actions is
limited. But to prevent the regulated community from taking advantage
of the lines so drawn in a manner that would undermine the original
principle behind the line drawing, an anti-abuse rule is put in place to bar
manipulation of the bright-line rules that runs counter to the original
principle they are supposed to invoke.
In the political activity context, this suggests the creation of safe-
harbor provisions for the most common types of election-related but
permissible activities while at the same time continuing to retain the
facts-and-circumstances approach as an anti-abuse rule. The IRS has in
fact already started down this road, albeit in nonprecedential materials,
with respect to candidate appearances. In its Tax Guide for Churches
and Religious Organizations, the IRS provided an example of how a
church could avoid violating the prohibition by inviting candidates for
the same office to speak to the congregation on successive Sundays.' 15
While it is beyond the scope of this article to develop these safe
harbors, others have already started that work. Professor Ellen Aprill has
written a letter to the IRS proposing a revenue procedure that would
create four such safe harbors with respect to statements by an
organization, whether oral or in writing, including statements that may
name a candidate." 6  Similar safe harbors would be useful in other
situations where the IRS has most commonly found violations, including
distribution of specific types of documents mentioning candidates, such
114. See Blatt, supra note 104, at 452; Weisbach, supra note 113, at 886; see
generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 104, at 268 (noting that the problem of
underinclusion can be remedied by backing up specific rules with a more general
standard). Examples of such structures include the detailed rules for partnerships
found in Subchapter K, I.R.C. §§ 701 et seq., which are backed up by a general anti-
abuse rule found in Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2005), and the detailed rules for corporate
reorganizations, I.R.C. §§ 351-368, which are backed up by rules such as the Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (as amended in 2007) requirement for "continuity of interest" for
certain reorganizations to qualify as tax free.
115. IRS Tax Guide for Churches, supra note 91, at 9.
116. Letter from Ellen Aprill, John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law, to Eric
Solomon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), et al. (Nov. 29, 2005),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2005/12/aprillproposes.html.
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as voter guides and candidate questionnaires." 17 At the same time, the
IRS should make clear in precedential guidance the types of activities
that are always forbidden, including campaign contributions, and, that
while the safe harbors may generally be relied upon, the IRS always
retains the power to invoke the general anti-abuse rule.
But even with clearer guidance and better detection, the IRS will
still face the issue of what penalties to impose when a violation is
discovered. Here the IRS' existing tools appear to be sufficient, at least
given the current uncertainty about both the actual levels of
noncompliance and the long-term effectiveness of IRS enforcement
efforts.
C. The Death Penalty, Warning Tickets, and Everything In Between
Initially, the only statutory penalty for violators was the
charitable equivalent of the death penalty-revocation of tax-exempt
status. Charities, or at least churches, perhaps feared it more than it
deserved-at least one court has noted that for churches it may be an
empty threat because their tax-exempt status (appropriately) isS 118
resurrected the day after revocation. Nevertheless, revocation was
feared by charities and also was used sparingly by the IRS, which had no
desire to kill an otherwise legitimate charity because of a single, perhaps
inadvertent, misstep." 
9
Recognizing the potential chilling effect of this dramatic penalty
and, conversely, the reluctance of the IRS to apply it to most violators,
117. IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, at 15-17.
118. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
This "resurrection" is a consequence of the fact that Congress does not require
churches, unlike other charities, to apply to the IRS for recognition of their tax-
exempt status. I.R.C. § 508(c) (West 2002). Churches are therefore automatically
exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2002) as long as they otherwise
meet the requirements of that section (including refraining from prohibited political
activities). The court therefore concluded that once a church ceases a prohibited
activity, such as political activity, it automatically has its tax-exempt status restored.
Branch Ministries, supra, at 142-43.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1623-24 (1987), as reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-1203 to -1205 (noting that the IRS may hesitate to revoke
exempt status when the penalty seems disproportionate).
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Congress created a more nuanced penalty regime in 1987.120 That
regime gives the IRS the ability to impose an excise tax on the amount of
political expenditures on both the charity and responsible managers, with
a second, higher level of tax imposed if the charity or managers refuse to
. 121
agree to correction of the expenditures. Congress also gave the IRS
the ability to both enjoin further political expenditures and immediately
assess both excise tax and income tax owed in the event of a flagrant
violation of the political activity prohibition.122
To this array of enforcement options, the IRS has also created its
own additional tool for addressing violations. As detailed with respect to
its 2004 audit program, the IRS will issue a "no-change written
advisory"-and not impose any financial or other penalty-when the
violation is a one-time act or was made inadvertently, usually because of
a good faith but incorrect understanding of the law, as long as the
organization corrects the violation to the degree possible and takes steps
• - • 123
to avoid future violations. Unlike normal no-change advisories, which
are issued when the tax law violations detected are insignificant, the IRS
issues these advisories even though it continues to maintain the position
124that there are no "insignificant" violations in this context. But the
effect is the same: good faith, minor violations combined with
repentance lead to simple warning tickets even though the IRS now also
has the option of imposing a penalty short of revocation.
This current approach is the best one, given what both IRS audits
to date and other available data indicate: the vast majority of violations
are minor and probably inadvertent.' 25 The warnings may in fact serve
an important educational function, by both clarifying for the charity
involved what activity is prohibited and alerting the charity to the fact
•• 126
that the IRS is enforcing the prohibition. At the same time, however,
120. H.R. REP. No. 100-391 at 1623-24, 1628-29.
121. I.R.C. § 4955 (West 2002).
122. I.R.C. §§ 4955, 6852, 7409 (West 2002).
123. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
124. IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20, at 18.
125. See supra PartI.
126. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement
When Individuals Learn the Penalty Only by Committing the Crime, 17 INT'L REv.
L. & ECON. 409 (1997) (arguing that enforcement actions can educate as well as
deter, particularly with respect to the magnitude of the possible penalties and the risk
of detection). Of course, learning that the penalties or the risk of detection is less
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the IRS should be sure to keep the entire array of possible penalties
available for use in those apparently rare cases where it finds either more
extensive violations, intentional violations, or an unwillingness on the
part of the charity to acknowledge that it violated the law ("I was only
going 55 miles per hour officer, really.").
The IRS should also assess the effectiveness of this approach,
possibly through follow-up examinations of violators (other than
churches, which are protected by § 7611) as well as by monitoring public
information about past violators in order to detect new violations, as it
has already indicated it plans to do.'27 If such follow-up examinations or
reviews indicate that the current approach is not effective in preventing
recidivism, then perhaps changes are needed to the penalty regime.
For example, one barrier to imposing a financial penalty under §
4955 is that it requires a determination of the expenditures for the alleged
political activity. 12  In the NAACP audit, the IRS initially asked the
NAACP to provide the total, undoubtedly multi-million dollar cost of the
annual convention, presumably to use for that calculation.' 29  The
NAACP responded, as protective measure, by paying the amount of tax
it claimed it owed under § 4955: 10 percent of the alleged political
expenditures or $17.65. 13 And how much is the "expenditure" when a
pastor endorses a candidate from the pulpit? 133 A way to avoid this issue
would be to impose a minimum flat penalty--e.g., $1,000 or $5,000 per
violation-regardless of the level of expenditures.
than you expected may increase noncompliance assuming the noncompliance was
intentional, see supra note 58 and accompanying text, but in this situation it appears
that most violators wish to comply.
127. See Lerner Comments, supra note 25, at 22 (noting that the IRS has
flagged charities that it found violated the prohibition but should not be subject to a
penalty for a follow-up check using publicly available information to ensure that
they do not repeat their violation).
128. See I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1) (imposing an initial tax on a charity of 10 percent
of its political expenditures).
129. Frances R. Hill, Auditing the NAACP, 2005 TAx NOTES TODAY 147-21
(Aug. 2005) (noting that the IRS initially asked for the cost of the entire annual
convention).
130. Fred Stokeld, NAACP Preparing to take IRS to Court, 2006 TAX NOTES
TODAY 63-1 (Apr. 2006).
131. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 896-897 (noting that even when a religious
leader invites a candidate to address the congregation during a regular worship
service, no additional funds are spent).
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Another proposal, made recently by two commentators, would
be to impose tax shelter promoter penalties on candidates or party
officials who knowingly encourage charities to violate the prohibition.'
32
While this proposal would reach only violations where such
encouragement occurred, if the IRS found that a significant number of
otherwise good faith, minor (or not so minor) violations are the result of
such encouragement, then such penalties might be appropriate.
At least for now, however, such changes are premature. First,
the IRS should be given the opportunity to use the already existing,
relatively flexible penalty regime to address what will be an expanded
universe of violations, if it follows my first recommendation. Only if
and when that regime is unable to sufficiently deter noncompliance
should changes to that regime be considered.
CONCLUSION
The prohibition on charities supporting or opposing candidates
for elected public office is now more than fifty years old. Yet despite its
longevity, both the extent to which charities comply with it and its exact
parameters remain unclear. The first two proposals seek to address these
uncertainties, first by testing the theory that minor and probably mostly
inadvertent violations are significantly more widespread than current IRS
enforcement efforts have determined, and, second, by clarifying the
prohibition's parameters, hopefully without creating opportunities for
abuse. But these uncertainties, combined with the uncertainties about the
likely effects of widespread but minor violations, if they are proven to
exist, argue against either any significant changes to the already flexible
penalty regime available to the IRS or a radical increase in resources for
enforcing the prohibition.
For these reasons, I believe modifications of that penalty regime
and the suggestion by my co-panelist Donald Tobin that a new agency is
needed to enforce the prohibition are premature. 33 At the same time, I
believe it is important that the IRS continue to inform the public about its
132. Owens & Fay, supra note 68. Full disclosure: Owens and Fay are
attorneys at the law firm for which I am Of Counsel.
133. See Tobin, supra note 6, at 1359-1362 (suggesting the creation of an
independent commission)
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enforcement activities in this sensitive area (as it did with respect to its
audits arising out of 2004 and earlier alleged political activities) and to
seek outside review of those activities as appropriate.' 3 4 Only with that
information will the charitable sector and the public be able to determine
whether in fact the IRS' enforcement program is sufficiently
comprehensive, effective in promoting compliance, and free from any
improper political influence. If the IRS is unable to demonstrate that it is
meeting these goals, then more significant changes may be in order.
134. See IRS 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 20; TIGTA REPORT, supra note
